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The article that follows examines the role 
of mayoral leadership in two large cities in 
Ukraine - Kiyv and Odessa. It begins with 
an examination of the various roles and 
resources typically found in the office of mayor, 
as well as a review of some of the unique 
characteristic of local governance in Ukraine. 
It then examines the activities of recent mayors 
in the two cities. It concludes by suggesting 
a somewhat expanded set of mayoral roles 
based on the Ukrainian experience.
The past two decades have been a time of major 
movement towards democratic governance throughout 
the world. In Central and Eastern Europe that movement 
has been reflected in dramatic transitions that have 
been widely watched and analyzed. In other countries 
of the world, even those that are traditionally cited as 
highly developed democratic systems, much change 
also has been occurring.
One of the main areas of democratic development 
in the region is reflected in the emergence and 
strengthening of local governance. In Central and 
Eastern Europe, a new generation of elected municipal 
leadership has emerged. Likewise, in countries with 
long histories of democratic development, such as those 
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in Western Europe and North America, local governments have been given more responsibilities and 
are seen as increasingly important actors in the process of democratic institution building. This is 
true in countries as diverse as Canada, Chile, France and Sweden.A key participant in this process 
of democratic development has been the local mayor. Increasingly, both countries making dramatic 
transitions to democracy, and those who are continuing long processes of democratic development, 
are witnessing the emergence of more dynamic, responsive and influential local leadership. In many 
instances, the person who embodies this development is, in fact, the local mayor.
This development can be seen in Ukraine, a country engaged in a complex and sometimes difficult 
transition to democracy. In this article, mayoral leadership and Ukrainian political-administrative 
relationships will be examined comparatively in two cities, Kyiv and Odessa. The two cities represent 
the two most significant cases of local governance development in that country during the past 
decade. Kyiv is not only the capital city of Ukraine, but represents the country’s most important and 
dynamic local economy. Odessa, on the other hand, arguably is the country’s most progressive local 
government. Odessa is the first city in the Ukraine to privatize its water system and has been a leader 
in establishing neighborhood based structures to mobilize citizen participation. In both cities the 
office of mayor (or head of city) and its occupant has been at the center of the most important local 
developments. As such, a comparative examination of the activities of the mayor in each city will 
enable us to better understand both the role of the mayor and the resources upon which they must 
rely in order to bring about significant local development. 
The Office of Mayor: Roles and Resources
A recent study of top level local government officials in 14 western countries (both elected mayors 
and appointed chief executive officers) by Poul Erick Mouritzen and James Svara, has suggested that 
there are four major roles played by the leader of local governments. These are serving as: public 
leader, policy leader, partisan leader, and proactive leader. As public leader, the mayor represents 
the community to the public and serves as the promoter of the community’s interest and wellbeing. 
As policy leader, the mayor initiates new directions in public policy and, as proactive leader, the 
mayor is responsible for setting a broader agenda for the future wellbeing of his or her community. 
The mayor, as partisan leader, serves as the leader of his or her local political party. 
To carry out these various tasks effectively, the mayor needs to mobilize all of the resources 
available to him or her. For the most part, these resources fall into two major categories – formal and 
informal. Formal resources involve those mayoral powers that are specifically identified in municipal, 
provincial, or national legislation. Typically, they involve the formal authority of the mayor as head 
of the municipal government. They include such resources as the authority to appoint and dismiss 
top level administrators (and in some increasingly rare cases, virtually all municipal employees); 
significant authority in the development of the municipal budget and in proposals for the raising of 
local revenue; a major role in establishing service delivery agency policy directions and significant 
authority vis-à-vis the municipal council. While the mayor’s formal resources may vary greatly from 
country to country and province to province, they are for the most part, a precondition of mayoral 
leadership that the office provides to its incumbents by endowing them with important governmental 
authority.
The other major area of resources available to municipal chief executives is what may be characterized 
as informal, or more personal, resources. In many instances, the most important such resource is the 
role of the municipal chief executive vis-à-vis his or her local political party. The municipal chief 
executive who is also the leader of the dominant local political party is more unlikely to have a high 
degree of support from the local municipal council and/or other policy-making bodies. In addition, the 
capacity of the local chief executive to lead his or her community is often affected by a host of other 
highly personal factors. Among these are the mayor’s knowledge and experience (both in municipal 
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affairs and politics); various individual attributes (reputation for integrity, speaking ability, familiar 
public image, etc.); personal resource mobilization capacity (individual or family wealth, capacity 
for mobilizing organizational and/or individual support, etc.); and level of energy, available time and 
degree of personal commitment. 
Basic Structure of Local Self-government in Ukraine
Local government in Europe, and other Western democracies, is regarded as representative and 
responsive of citizen interests. Similarly, local government is one of the most important elements 
in Ukraine's system of public administration. The Ukrainian Constitution adopted on June 28, 1996 
established several important principles of local self-governance in Ukraine and defined approaches 
to its power. The Constitution of Ukraine recognizes that local government represents the right of a 
territorial community (the inhabitants of a village, town, or city) to make decisions on local issues 
independently. This right can be exercised either directly, for example, through referendum, or 
indirectly, through local government bodies such as councils and their executive boards.
The local self-government structure in Ukraine consists of the local council, the Mayor, the executive 
committee, the municipal secretary and various local government departments. According to the law 
of Ukraine “On Local Self-Government”, the local council can act on about 50 functions involving a 
rather wide circle of activities. The local council enacts municipal legislation and establishes standing 
committees, composed of council deputies, that monitor issues related to specific areas of activity. 
The mayor, who is elected for a four-year-term on the basis of universal, equal and direct suffrage by 
secret ballot, leads the executive body of the council, presides at its meetings, calls council sessions, 
determines the agenda, chairs the sessions, signs the council's decisions into law and is the only 
person who can represent the council in its relations with other legal entities. 
The executive committee – which is chaired and appointed by the Mayor with the approval of the 
local council - collectively makes executive decisions and consists of experts in city management. It 
cannot, however, include members of the municipal council. The municipal secretary, who often acts 
as a deputy mayor, is nominated by the mayor and elected by the council. The departments of the city 
administration usually include separate units for the various areas of local concern -- e.g. budgeting, 
economic development, municipal property management, housing services, public transportation, 
construction, education, health care, culture, sport, regulation of land relations, ecology and social 
protection.
The city mayor, as the highest person of local self-government, is given responsibility by city 
residents to exercise both representative and executive authority, and to oversee and control the 
administrative functions of local self-government. The mayor, executing these functions, signs 
the executive committee's decisions, and is authorized to represent the executive committee in its 
relations with other organizations. The mayor also has the authority to hire and fire the department 
heads. These functions testify that the position of the city mayor is the most important position in 
the system of local self-government. 
The mayor manages the budget, represents the city in relations with various bodies of state 
(national) power, other bodies of local self-government, provides everyday management of local 
affairs and insures the execution of City Council decisions. The financial basis for the execution 
of administrative functions relies upon various sources of funding including public property; local 
revenues; other funds; land or natural resources owned by territorial communities, cities and city 
districts; and also common property that is managed by district and oblast councils. 
On the whole, there are more than twenty mayoral functions identified in the Law of Ukraine 
“On Local Self-Government” Though all functions and responsibilities noted above are inherent 
responsibilities for any mayor, the success of their implementation and/or realization in each specific 
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politico-administrative situation is significantly influenced by the behavior and abilities of the 
mayor. The leader of the local self-government must be a person whom the local community trusts 
to make those decisions which are best from the point of view of city/municipal/urban interests. He 
or she must also be able to effectively mobilize both the formal and informal resources available to 
the holder of the office. 
In Ukraine, there are two different types of urban affairs management: the system of local self-
government, which exists separate from the national administration, and the system which is 
characterized by the merging in a single community of the bodies of local self-government and the 
national, or state, power at the local level. Within the first system, the bodies of local self-government 
execute only the predefined competencies of local government and any responsibilities of public 
power specifically delegated to them by national ministries or oblast administrations. 
Within the second type, at the level of cities, local officials form both the bodies of local self-
government and the agencies of national or state power. In such cities, the Mayor, elected by the 
population and is simultaneously appointed by the President of Ukraine to be the head of the local 
state administration. Thus, the bodies of local self-government and the executive bodies of state 
power co-exist in the municipal government on the basis of mutual delegation of responsibilities. 
The second system exists only in two important national cities – the capital city of Kyiv and the 
Crimean capital of Sebastopol. 
Particular aspects of the exercise of local self-government in the Cities of Kyiv and Sebastopol are 
determined by special laws of Ukraine. Among the special laws in the sphere of local self-government 
is the law “On Capital of Ukraine – City-Hero Kyiv”. It was adopted on January 15, 1999 by the 
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, was signed by the President and was published in February 1999. This 
law provides that the Kyiv community elects the Kyiv City mayor, deputies of the city council and 
also deputies of city district councils. This arrangement means that the Mayor of Kiev and the Mayor 
of Odessa have, quite different degrees of power and authority.
The Mayor in Kyiv
Kyiv is a city that has undergone dramatic changes during the last decade. Ten years ago it was 
a city that was very dark at night, had virtually no luxury goods, and at times looked rather grim. 
Today, it is a city of bright lights, many lovely shops, and pleasant restaurants and outdoor cafes. 
Not all have benefited equally from the changes, however, and that is one of the perennial issues 
of concern. Some have become very wealthy, many are getting along, and some have been left very 
far behind. A major player in bringing about the transformation of Kyiv has been the city’s mayor, 
during most of this period, Oleksander Omelchenko.
Prior to the 1999 election, Kyiv’s then mayor, Leonid Kosakivsky, led a city council that was divided 
almost equally between two political parties, the Communists and Rukh, a somewhat conservative, 
free-market oriented party. This situation, a city council almost equally divided between left and 
right, created a serious division of political power. Not only was the city council unable to make 
rapid decisions, but it frequently was acting in opposition to the mayor. 
In addition, to his problems with the city council, Kosakivsky was often in conflict with, and 
perceived to be highly disliked by then Ukrainian President, Leonid Kuchma. This was of particular 
significance since, as noted above, the mayor of Kyiv has significant authority and responsibilities that 
derive from the national government. In addition, in a highly centralized country with an historically 
encompassing national government, the President of Ukraine would inevitably have major influence 
within the capital city. In part, because of the political power stalemate in the city council, and the 
apparent lack of support from President Kuchma, Kosakivsky was perceived as a not very effective 
leader. The result of this was that Kosakivsky was frequently characterized as someone who, though 
he spoke beautifully, was afraid of everything and did nothing.
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As a result of his political problems, Kosakivsky was strongly challenged in the 1998 election, and 
ultimately lost the mayoral election to O.Omelchenko, who received 72% of the vote. Unlike Kosakivsky, 
Omelchenko had been able to put together a broad coalition of political support. In the election campaign, 
a wide range of political parties (from “the left wing” to “the right wing”), numerous non-governmental 
organizations (including the “Afghanistan War Soldiers”), and leaders of many small and medium-sized 
businesses supported him. In total, the Omelchenko team formed an electoral coalition, “Our Mayor is 
O.Omelchenko”, which included 42 non-governmental organizations, 25 political parties, 18 women’s 
groups, 11 youth groups, 4 religious groups, and many deputies of the city council.
Omelchenko’s ability to put together such a wide-ranging coalition of support served him well 
in two regards. First, it created an impressive base of campaign support – far greater than that of 
any of his rivals. Second, it also suggested that he was a strong leader. As a result of this success, 
Omelchenko was able to receive significant voting support from all elements of Kyiv’s population, 
including the wealthy, the middle class and the poor.
One result of Omelchenko’s convincing victory in the 1998 elections was the bringing to the Kyiv 
city council many of his closest allies. In fact, following the 1998 election, the largest party grouping 
in the council was the 35 deputies from the “Yednist” (“Unity”) political party, which was headed 
by Omelchenko. As a result, Omelchenko was in a position to consolidate his authority, with all 
of his chief deputies and the heads of the mayor city agencies all belonging to his political party 
grouping.
Not only did Omelchenko develop a strong majority in the city council, but in addition, he began 
to rapidly build alliances with powerful authorities in the national government. He also made major 
efforts to interact on a routine basis with various citizen groups and individual citizens, while at the 
same time cultivating relationships with the city’s most economically powerful citizens.
While local self-government needs support from the bottom, in Kyiv support from the top authorities 
of the state is no less important. In general, Omelchenko was able to receive such support, although 
he was not without his critics. More than a few national and local leaders suggested that Omelchenko 
was too arrogant, too independent, and too non-controlled for the typical Ukrainian leader. In fact, 
many suggested that Omelchenko created “a kingdom within a kingdom” – in essence, his own 
autonomous subsystem under the strict and semi-authoritarian regime of President Kuchma. In 
fact, his relationships with Kuchma varied greatly from time to time, but in general, they were quite 
positive.
Subsequently, when Viktor Yushchenko came to power on the strength of the “Orange Revolution”, 
he also developed strong relationships with Omelchenko (who had supported the Orange Revolution). 
However, as with Yushchenko’s predecessor Kuchma, there were instances of conflict. Often those 
have involved not direct criticism of Omelchenko, but rather criticism of his staff. However, both 
Yushchenko and Omelchenko realized that they needed to work together.
Under both presidents, Omelchenko remained a highly visible figure, perceived to be a strong 
leader. In that regard, Omelchenko was able to put together team of talented specialists who worked 
harmoniously with him (in part because of a fear that opposition would lead to dismissal) to develop 
his program of activities. As mayor, Omelchenko engaged in a wide array of activities. He supported 
and facilitated many efforts at new development within Kyiv. This included a major rebuilding of the 
central downtown square, Independence Square (Maidan Nezalezhnosti), complete with a beautiful 
underground shopping center and a variety of above ground columns and monuments. In particular, 
he put great influence on what was characterized as “the philosophy of concrete deeds”.
As mayor, Omelchenko took great pride in being identified as the city’s “builder, chief economist 
and housekeeper”. He was constantly organizing new coalitions from the various political parties 
and groups of city council deputies. He built not only houses and underground stores, but he also 
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continued to build quite successfully, the foundation of his own political power. He routinely 
lobbied for local and national laws which strengthened the advantages of Kyiv’s mayor’s power over 
the state administration power of the national government. He also was skillful in overseeing and 
maximizing the city’s financial situation. In doing so, he built the system of financial flows in such 
a way that decisions orders and permissions regarding municipal finances went through him and, 
thus, he had direct control over the larger part of municipal budget including funds granted through 
the state administration.
Not surprisingly, within a few years of assuming Mayorship, Omelchenko had developed the image 
and reputation of being the “boss” of the city. He was seen as a highly successful political leader 
who was particularly concerned with the physical rebuilding of the city, including the development 
of new highways, parking garages and hotels. He was also seen as something of a showman, as a 
result of both his authoritative and dynamic style, and his inclination to organize concerts in the city 
square that he had so energetically rebuilt. However, he was not without his critics, including many 
of the local non-governmental organizations who claimed he had little concern about the traditional 
buildings and landscape of Kyiv.
Particularly important in terms of Omelchenko’s ability to succeed as mayor, was the fact that Kyiv’s 
economy began to develop very strongly under his leadership of the city. Between 2002-2003, annual 
industrial productivity within Kyiv grew by 14% - far and away, the largest such increase since the 
proclaiming of Ukraine’s independence. In addition, as the city was physically rehabilitated, tourism 
began to develop. This, in turn, encouraged significant investment in the city’s economy. According 
to data produced by the city’s statistical agency, investment in the first half of 2004 exceeded that of 
the entirety of 2003, with the key investing countries being the United States, the United Kingdom, 
Germany, Austria, Switzerland and Cyprus. In addition, many of the city’s strategic enterprises 
remained as property of the municipality. This ensured the employment of many thousands of Kyiv 
residents, and certainly encouraged their loyalty to the municipal leadership. All of this resulted in a 
situation in which the municipal budget was generally in quite good shape throughout Omelchenko’s 
tenure as mayor.
Many factors contributed to Omelchenko’s success. He is quick to borrow ideas from other major 
municipalities. While giving the impression of being a strong leader, he didn’t hesitate to seek 
political compromises when necessary. He made sure to maintain good political relationships with 
both the national government and key local figures. In addition to his talent as a leader, he has a good 
understanding of the financial implications of the job. Finally, he was very successful in creating 
significant political coalitions. 
The Mayor in Odessa
Odessa is arguably Ukraine’s second most cosmopolitan city. While a relatively young city 
(approximately 200 years old), it nevertheless has a very strong cultural and literary tradition. It also 
has an exceptionally strong commercial base, in part, due to its role as the country’s most significant 
commercial seaport. Further contributing to its overall economic wellbeing is the fact that, dating 
back to the nineteen century, the city has historically been one of the region’s most important tourist 
destinations for the political elite. 
The city has also been a site of ongoing political conflict within and around the office of mayor. 
The conflict has manifested itself in two different but related ways. First, there has been the ongoing 
rivalry between two strong-willed, but very different individuals. Second, there has been the ongoing 
conflict between levels of government. In fact, the contradictions between the Law of Ukraine “On 
Local Self-Government” and the legislation on state administrations (oblast and local bodies of 
executive power – raions) has constantly created conflicts of responsibilities between these two 
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levels of governmental power. In the mid 90’s such conflict existed in a major way in Odessa. This 
was reflected in a history of considerable and intense political conflict between the Odessa City 
government (headed by Ruslan Bodelan). In many respects, these conflicts – especially between 
Gurvits and Bodelan – reflected the conflicts between the old Communist Ukraine and the emerging 
democratic Ukraine.
Gurvits, who was Odessa mayor from 1994 - 1998, was a person who had never occupied party 
posts, a businessman of the first generation, a representative of the more democratic, free market 
parts of Ukrainian society. Gurvits and Bodelan belonged to two different political and economic 
worlds (e.g. in the landmard 2004 President’s elections they supported different candidates: Bodelan 
being the head of the regional office of the Party of Regions supported outgoing President Kuchma’s 
candidate, Viktor Yanukovich; while Gurvits supported the Orange Revolusion opposition, Viktor 
Yushchenko).
In the mid 1990’s, Bodelan, as the representative of the President, served as the head of oblast 
administration. Prior to that, he had experience in Komsomol League and Communist Party activity. 
His career was that of a typical party bureaucratic apparatus worker. He worked in numerous 
administrative structures including Secretary of the Communist Party district committee, of its oblast 
committee, of its oblast committee, as an administrator of various Komsomol organs; instructor at 
the Central Committee of the Lenin Young Communists League of Ukraine; and first secretary of 
district committee and the oblast committee. Through these positions, he had developed considerable 
administrative experience and managerial skill. Sometimes as a party administrator he fell back on 
the “old traditions”, but at other times, he did try to adapt methods of old-command-administrative 
system to modern conditions. At those times, he did try to engage in the art of compromise and could 
behave in a diplomatic fashion.
Bodelan’s career did have some difficult periods. He was dismissed from his position as head of the 
Odessa oblast state administration, as a result of political conflict with the President of the country. 
In order to rebuild his political power base, he and various of his supporters created an important 
non-governmental organization (NGO) that came to be known as “Renaissance of the Region”. It was 
funded on the basis of membership fees paid by industrial organizations, trade unions and other 
important supporting organizations. The NGO focused on activities designed to enhance Bodelan’s 
image with the public. In order to do so, it engaged in some very basic activities, such as making 
food available to low income individuals at relatively cheap prices, and organizing other kinds of 
activities to develop popular support. 
As Mayor prior to 1998, Gurvits and his team had much success in their activity. Odessa had 
developed even more status as a prominent resort city; it had obtained a good credit rating; and much 
investment was attracted to the city which facilitated development of an international airport and 
the building of the techno-park. However, between 1994 - 1998, major social-political city conflict 
characterized the city government in Odessa tension between the oblast administration and the city 
administration split the local community. 
The 1998 election put an end to the political contradiction between oblast and municipality in 
Odessa. The election campaign resulted in unprecedented nastiness, insinuations and campaign 
offences. Gurvits drew into his election campaign the city’s commercial structures and formed his 
own special election ideology, “everything is devoted to one goal – to win”.
On the strength great efforts, Bodelan came to power as Odessa Mayor in the 1998 elections. In 
his election campaign, Bodelan said “the city is becoming a discredit, the housing fund is dying, the 
electric transport is ruined… Odessa is being destroyed. I want to help my city. I am going to live 
here”. However, Gurvits claimed that the election had been manipulated on behalf of Bodelan and 
that the political contradiction remained due to the fact that during the four years of his mayorship 
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he had the un-doubted support of the Odessa residents, but that Bodelan had come to the office 
without that support. 
Speaking about himself as a Mayor, Bodelan had commented: “I am stable in m position. It is not a 
passive position, but an active one, with the President’s support (Kuchma), on reforming the political 
system, the administrative-territorial system of Ukaraine” Bodelan went on to suggest that “a bad 
law is better than no law” and as such he required the municipality be guided by national law and 
its requirements, and demanded from his subordinates a respect of the public norms. Initially, the 
acts in Bodelan’s City Council were adopted in a rather quiet manner in the sense that there was very 
little political conflict within the Council or between it, the Mayor or the state (oblast and national) 
administration. As mass media in Odessa described, it was because the overwhelming majority of 
deputies was formed to serve one person – the Mayor – and among the deputies there were very few 
people ready to be in opposition to city authorities. The absence of serious debate was perceived by 
the media to be a very negative fact regarding the character and quality of decisions made. 
After new elections in March, 2002 Bodelan was re-elected the mayor of Odessa (though, according 
to exit-poll data, his rival Gurvits, had won the election attracting two to three times more votes than 
Bodelan). Gurvits, who ran for Odessa mayor as a candidate from the “Our Ukraine” coalition, claimed 
that there were many electoral violations on the day of elections and during the vote counting, and 
that they had been videotaped and registered by observers. Consequently, Gurvits brought suit and 
the results of the election went into the courts and on May 21, 2002 the Odessa Zhovtnevy District 
Court turned down the lawsuit of E. Gurvits against Odessa Mayor R. Bodelan. The court declared 
the decision of the Odessa City Election Committee to register Bodelan as Odessa Mayor and the 
results of mayoral election to be legitimate. In line with the decisions of the Odessa City Election 
Committee, Bodelan was re-registered Odessa mayor.
However, as a result of opposition to Bodelan in the mass media there was created a critical 
attitude on the part of some Odessa citizens to City Council decisions. The opposition to the Mayor 
also was formed by and consisted of Gurvits supporters. After the creation of the “Nasha Ukraina 
(Our Ukraine)” block led by Gurvits, the opposition to Bodelan “poured” smoothly into it. This 
opposition was always interested in Bodelan’s resignation or retirement – believing fervently that 
he had stolen the 1992 election.
One of the main successes of Bodelan’s mayorship was seen in the growth of the international 
role of Odessa. While Odessa remained the southern gate of Ukraine, the years of independence 
had given rise to the development of new transit routes. However, Odessa kept pace through the 
integration of its transport complex into the system of international transport corridors. To facilitate 
this, the Odessa airport was re-constructed, new capacities were created for the Odessa seaport and 
a new autobahn from Odessa to Kyiv was begun.
Within the city itself, the electric municipal transport was renewed (Bodelan had spoken about the 
need to buy new trams and trolleybuses during the campaign). The quality of the drinking water was 
improved and water supply was provided during both day and night (although much remains to be 
done in terms of an adequate water supply). Towards this end, the water system was privatized. Work 
was done to improve the beaches (private capital was attracted); and many communal apartments 
were sold to private owners.
A key element of the Bodelan administration was the degree of cooperation between levels of 
government – city and oblast and national governments. In contrast to Gurvits, Bodelan had very 
strong ties to the political establishment in Kyiv and in Ukraine as a whole. He respected to power 
of the President and looked to the Verhovna Rada (the parliament) and the President to help solve 
local economic and social problems. 
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Bodelan argued that solving the problems of the city is possible only by working together and 
there were lots of such examples e.g. building of streets/roads in Odessa was provided with support 
of oblast budget; the re-construction of Odessa Opera House- with the support of the President and 
the national government. Good relations with powerful people characterized Bodelan’s personality, 
and as such, facilitated his successful activity. This contrasted dramatically with Gurvits, the 
previous mayor, who could not work well with the central authorities. Whereas Bodelan was an ally 
of President Kuchma, Gurvits felt the President was to be a primitive person who was not carful and 
behaved in a risky manner. This non-respectful attitude to the head of state created great indignation 
among the President’s supporters. 
For three years (2002-2005), the opposition was confident that the data they had was enough to get 
the Mayor dismissed. As the 2004 presidential elections approached, the conflict between Bodelan and 
Gurvits reemerged. It was widely suggested that, “if you are against Bodelan – vote for Yushchenko. 
Yanukovich tomorrow means Bodelan forever”. City authorities, aiming to survive, worked hard for 
Yanukovich. Bodelan headed the city organization of “The Party of Regions” (where Yanukovich 
was a leader) and, as a result, in Odessa you could see only Yanukovich billboards saying “Odessa 
supports Yanukovich”.
In March 2005, after President’s elections and V.Yushchenko (leader of “Our Ukraine”) victory, 
People's Deputy and once Odessa mayor Gurvits filed a complaint with the Odessa Primorsky Disrtrict 
Court to challenge the returns of the March 31, 2002 Odessa mayor elections. On April 4, 2005 the 
Odessa Primorsky District Court completed hearing the Gurvits vs City electoral commission case 
and ruled to invalidate the electoral commission's resolution # 201 of April 3, 2002, which declared 
Ruslan Bodelan as having won the mayor elections. The Court ruled to oblige the electoral commission 
to register Eduard Gurvits as the Odessa mayor. Consequently, Gurvits became the second person in 
Ukraine (along with the President of the country) who had won his fight over fair elections in the court. 
The new mayor has initiated and is realizing the process of re-privatization of municipal property.
Reconsidering the Role of the Mayor
By having examined the role of the mayor in both Ukrainian cities, we have been able to obtain a 
comprehensive picture of the many activities in which a successful mayor t routinely engage. We also 
have obtained a better sense of the many responsibilities required of the holder of the office by looking 
at the mayor as both as administrative and political leader. In fact, when one combines the political 
and policy responsibilities of top level local officials with their administrative responsibilities, one 
can identify several significant roles performed by local leaders in Ukraine’s mayor cities.. Among 
these, are:
1. Exemplar of the Public Image of the Local Community: While often the realities of performance 
may fall short, certainly many local citizens see their chief local government official as representing 
that which is best about their community in terms of a variety of values ranging from personal integrity 
to entrepreneurial achievement.
2. Creator of Political Coalitions: In most local communities, and especially larger ones, the issues 
addressed by local governments are complex enough to involve many different political and economic 
interests. The mayor is individual most often expected to negotiate among those various interests in 
order to achieve the consensus necessary to move forward on major issues of community concern.
3. Initiator of Policy Proposals: While many proposals for new policies emerge out of either the 
agencies of the local government or from various interest groups, in most instances it is the mayor 
who commands the necessary attention to really bring new ideas onto the local political agenda. 
Consequently, the local chief executive is expected to be the principal advocate of policy reform 
and innovation.
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4. Developer of Long-term Vision for the Community: While one of the major responsibilities of 
the local chief executive is to deal with immediate policy concerns, increasingly, it is expected that 
this will be done within the context of the development of a long-term vision of where the community 
should be moving. The development of such a vision, while the responsibility of the mayor, must 
also integrate the interests of the diverse elements that are found in many local communities. 
5. Representative of the Community to Other Levels of Government: In many instances, municipal 
affairs are highly impacted by other levels of government (state, provincial, national, etc.). It is 
increasingly expected that the local chief executive will take the lead role in addressing those issues 
that involve other levels of government.
6. Responder to Constituent Needs: As municipal governments have become more important, 
and as they have increased the array of services which they deliver to local communities, the role 
of the municipal chief executive in being the person to whom local citizens look when they have a 
problem has grown significantly.
7. Promotor of the Local Community: With the emergence of stronger local government, it is 
increasingly expected that the local mayor will serve as the chief publicist of the virtues of the 
community that he or she represents. This can range from promoting tourism to persuading private 
entrepreneurs that the mayor’s city represents the best prospect for successful business activity.
Conclusion
The effective Ukrainian mayor must possess the ability to unite the territorial community, to create 
coalitions to achieve mutual goals, to regulate internal and external relations, to defend municipal 
interests as regards to other territorial units and the state, to gain support through political parties, 
and to influence the formation of general values. Unfortunately these political functions are not 
clearly defined in current legislation. That means that sometimes the mayor does not have adequate 
resources to guarantee the success of her/his activity. Also, there are times when mayors who have 
been elected by city population are dismissed, through political machinations, from their positions 
without the citizens’ agreement. Sometimes this can be for incompetence, but often it is for highly 
political reasons. 
Nevertheless, there can be no question of the importance of the Mayor in terms of the building of 
the local community. In both Kyiv and Odessa, aggressive and energetic mayors played mayor roles 
in moving those cities forward in very significant ways. They did this by drawing upon all of both the 
informal and the formal resources which are typically available to mayors. Equally as important, they 
assumed at one time or another all of the various roles that mayors can assume, and which has been 
described above. Most notably is this regard, they work diligently at initiating significant political 
coalitions and developing important relationships with other levels of government – especially high 
level national government officials. 
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